Query Details
id: a1b2c3d4-0007-4a5b-8c9d-dns007rebinding
name: DNS Rebinding — Rapid TTL Change for Same Domain
description: |
Detects DNS rebinding preparation by identifying domains that resolve to
multiple different IP addresses within a short window with rapid re-resolution.
In a DNS rebinding attack, the attacker's domain initially resolves to a public
IP, then switches to an internal/loopback IP (127.0.0.1, 192.168.x.x, 0.0.0.0)
after the TTL expires. This allows JavaScript from the attacker's domain to
access internal services by bypassing the browser's Same-Origin Policy.
Ref: GitHub Security Lab — "DNS rebinding attacks explained"
Ref: Singularity of Origin (NCC Group), rbndr (Tavis Ormandy)
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: WindowsDnsAma
dataTypes:
- ASimDnsActivityLogs
queryFrequency: 30m
queryPeriod: 30m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
- LateralMovement
- DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
- T1557
- T1090
tags:
- DNS Rebinding
- Same-Origin Policy Bypass
- SSRF
- Browser-based attack
query: |
ASimDnsActivityLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30m)
| where EventResult =~ "Success"
| where DnsAnswerCount > 0
| summarize
QueryCount = count(),
FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated),
SrcHostname = any(SrcHostname)
by SrcIpAddr, DnsQuery
| where QueryCount >= 5
| extend SpanSeconds = datetime_diff('second', LastSeen, FirstSeen)
| where SpanSeconds > 0
| extend ReResolutionRate = round(todouble(QueryCount) / todouble(SpanSeconds) * 60.0, 2)
| where ReResolutionRate >= 2
| project
SrcIpAddr,
SrcHostname,
DnsQuery,
QueryCount,
ReResolutionRate,
SpanSeconds,
FirstSeen,
LastSeen
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: HostName
columnName: SrcHostname
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SrcIpAddr
- entityType: DNS
fieldMappings:
- identifier: DomainName
columnName: DnsQuery
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: "DNS Rebinding — {{SrcHostname}} re-resolved {{DnsQuery}} {{QueryCount}} times"
alertDescriptionFormat: "Potential DNS rebinding: {{SrcHostname}} re-resolved {{DnsQuery}} {{QueryCount}} times in {{SpanSeconds}} seconds ({{ReResolutionRate}} re-resolutions/min). Attackers use rapid TTL expiry to redirect domain from public to internal IP."
customDetails:
ReResolutionRate: ReResolutionRate
TargetDomain: DnsQuery
This query is designed to detect potential DNS rebinding attacks by monitoring DNS activity. Here's a simplified breakdown:
Purpose: The query identifies domains that resolve to multiple different IP addresses within a short time frame, which is a common behavior in DNS rebinding attacks. These attacks can allow an attacker to bypass browser security and access internal services.
Data Source: It uses DNS activity logs from Windows DNS via the WindowsDnsAma connector.
Frequency: The query runs every 30 minutes and looks at DNS logs from the past 30 minutes.
Detection Logic:
Output: The query outputs details like the source IP address, source hostname, DNS query, number of queries, re-resolution rate, and time span of the queries.
Alerts: If the conditions are met, an alert is generated with details about the potential DNS rebinding activity, including how many times the domain was re-resolved and the rate of re-resolution.
Severity and Tactics: The severity is marked as Medium, and it relates to tactics like Lateral Movement and Defense Evasion, with techniques T1557 and T1090.
Tags: The query is tagged with terms like DNS Rebinding, Same-Origin Policy Bypass, SSRF, and Browser-based attack to categorize the type of threat.
In essence, this query is a security measure to detect suspicious DNS behavior that could indicate a DNS rebinding attack, which is a method attackers use to exploit vulnerabilities in web browsers and access internal networks.

David Alonso
Released: March 26, 2026
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