Query Details
// Malicious FIDO2 Registration Threat Detection // https://www.linkedin.com/posts/activity-7219732839422992385-FHSM/ // In the event of a user account being compromised, a threat actor may attempt to register a passkey for persistence. This ensures that even if the account password is reset automatically, the passkey remains intact for ongoing malicious activities. By using audit logs, one can determine the IP address used for the threat actor’s passkey registration and correlate this information with threat intelligence data from BehaviourAnalytics to identify potential malicious FIDO2 passkey registration and abuse. let PasskeyAuthenticatorIP = AuditLogs | where ResultDescription contains "User registered Fido2 Authentication Method" | extend AuthenticatorIP = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress) | distinct AuthenticatorIP; BehaviorAnalytics | where TimeGenerated > ago(90d) | extend ThreatIntelIndicatorDescription = DevicesInsights.ThreatIntelIndicatorDescription | where isnotempty( ThreatIntelIndicatorDescription ) | where SourceIPAddress has_any(PasskeyAuthenticatorIP)
This KQL query is designed to detect potentially malicious FIDO2 passkey registrations by analyzing audit logs and correlating them with threat intelligence data. Here's a simplified breakdown:
Identify IP Addresses from Audit Logs:
AuthenticatorIP) from these events.Correlate with Threat Intelligence:
BehaviorAnalytics data from the past 90 days.In essence, the query aims to find IP addresses used for registering FIDO2 passkeys and checks if these IPs are associated with any known threats, helping to detect and prevent ongoing malicious activities.

Steven Lim
Released: August 2, 2024
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